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Abstract—The concern for location privacy in mobile ap-
plications is commonly motivated by a scenario in which a
mobile device communicates personal location data, i.e. the
device holder location, to a third party e.g. LBS provider, in
exchange for some information service. We argue that this
scenario offers a partial view of the actual risks for privacy,
because in reality the information ﬂow can be more complex.
For example, more and more often location is computed by
a third party, the location provider, e.g. Google Location
Service. Location providers are in the position of collecting
huge amounts of location data from the users of diverse
applications (e.g. Facebook and Foursquare to cite a few). This
raises novel privacy concerns. In this paper, we discuss two
issues related to the protection from location providers. The
ﬁrst focuses on the compliance of emerging location services
standards with European data protection norms; the latter
focuses on hard privacy solutions protecting from untrusted
location providers.
Keywords-Location privacy, geolocation services, W3C geolo-
cation standard, data protection directive, LBS
I. INTRODUCTION
Individual location is an enabling factor in a variety of
mobile applications such as LBS (location-based services)
and mobile sensing: LBS provide spatial information upon
location based spatial queries (e.g. where is the closest
restaurant?); mobile sensing enables the collection of geo-
referenced data from sensor-equipped mobile phones (e.g.
air quality). In all of these situations the user’s location is
communicated to some other party. As location can reveal
details of one’s personal life, such communication may result
into a loss of user’s control over personal data. In the context
of information privacy [6], such loss of control translates into
loss of privacy. In what follows, we refer to location privacy
as the capability of controlling the way personal location is
disclosed and used by a remote third party.
A large body of literature on location privacy focuses on
privacy protection from untrusted application providers, e.g.
a honest-but-curious LBS provider can take advantage of the
location information it receives upon a request of service.
To prevent such a risk, the solution commonly adopted is
to map the actual location of the mobile device (client),
obtained from e.g. GPS, into a different representation which
somehow masks the true location. For example, location can
be mapped onto a coarse location, a fake location, or be
encrypted or even suppressed. Once transformed (and not
suppressed) the client location is conveyed to the application
provider.
Figure 1. Architecture: the client transmits to the LP contextual informa-
tion (e.g. set of Wi-Fi access points, ap1,..apn) to obtain location p which
is then conveyed to some LBS provider
Quite different is the situation in which the client requests
the location from a third party location provider (LP), as il-
lustrated in Figure 1. Note that location services are currently
offered by major IT players, e.g. Google, Microsoft, Apple,
Skyhook Wireless and used in a myriad of apps and Web
applications. The protocol is as follows: the client senses the
communication infrastructure in proximity and transmits to
the LP e.g. the Wi-Fi access points and GSM/CDMA based
stations being detected. This information is then matched
onto a database of geo-referenced network components and
used to estimate the location which is ﬁnally returned to the
client. The advantage of this architecture is that consumer
devices, e.g. smartphones, tablets, notebooks, can be located
pervasively both in indoor and indoor settings, and across
urban and rural areas, with an accuracy which can be of a
few tens of meters.
It is evident, however, that in such scenario users’ loca-
tions are disclosed not only to the application provider but
also to the LP. This raises the question of how to ensure
location privacy from the LP. Note that the aforementioned
location privacy techniques (i.e. the LBS scenario) are not
of help because the communication protocol as well as the
semantics of the communication is different.
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In this paper we brieﬂy describe recent research con-
ducted on this topic along two different directions. The
ﬁrst direction focuses on the compliance of a geo-location
standard, i.e. the W3C geo-location API for accessing lo-
cation services, with European data protection norms. This
problem is of practical relevance because the standard is
widespread used while its impact on privacy is probably
not widely clear yet. The second direction is more research
oriented and explores a possible approach to minimizing
the communication with potential untrusted LPs. In this
case, the challenge is to provide comprehensive protection
of location from both the LP and the application provider.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides background knowledge on location systems and
data protection regulation in Europe; Section III introduces
the two aforementioned research directions; Section IV
reports ﬁnal considerations.
II. LOCATION TECHNIQUES AND PRIVACY NORMS
A. Location systems
The location of a mobile device, i.e. a smartphone, can
be estimated using a multiplicity of techniques [5]. Crucial
for privacy is the distinction between handset-based and
network-based solutions: in the former case the location
is computed by the mobile device itself, in the latter by
a third party, e.g. telecommunication operator. The most
popular handset-based positioning technique is GPS. GPS
provides worldwide coverage and supports a range of loca-
tion services with accuracies that range from a few meters
to a few millimeters. However, when integrated in mobile
phones, GPS localization presents severe limitations i.e. it
is power consuming, moreover the device must be located
in a position in line of sight with at least 4 satellites for
the location to be estimated. This means that GPS cannot
be used inside buildings, underground and in the so called
urban canyons [5]. In those environments network-based
localization techniques are appropriate, such as cellular
(GSM/CMDA) and Wi-Fi (802.11) based systems. Taken
singularly, all of these technologies are limited. Recent
hybrid location systems overcome these limits integrating
different technologies, e.g. cellular, Wi-Fi and IP-based
positioning, to offer unprecedented opportunities in terms of
location coverage and accuracy. This explains the increasing
concern for business models offering location as a service
and that is what we focus on.
B. Data protection in Europe.
In view of what will be discussed shortly, in particular the
compliance of standards with European privacy regulation,
we brieﬂy describe the general Data Protection Directive
and the so-called ePrivacy Directive, the main pillars of the
EU legal framework regarding processing of personal and
location data.
Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC). The general
Data Protection Directive (hereafter: DPD) consists of a
layered system of three levels. The ﬁrst level is the general
level that applies to all processing of personal data. The
second level is applicable when sensitive data are being
processed. The third level is applicable when personal
data are being transferred to third countries. The layered
system is cumulative, meaning that if sensitive data are
being transferred to third countries, all three levels apply.
The DPD applies to the processing of personal data which
is deﬁned as any information relating to an identiﬁed or
identiﬁable natural person (data subject), while processing
covers any operation or set of operations which is performed
upon personal data. Both concepts are interpreted in a very
broad manner. Besides the three levels within the DPD, the
EU legal framework on data protection consists of two more
levels of protection. Of these, the fourth level concerns
sector speciﬁc regulations, such as Directive 2002/58/EC
(ePrivacy Directive) which is relevant for location data.
The ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC) The provisions
of Directive 2002/58/EC (as amended by 2009/136/EC)
particularize and complement the DPD in the ﬁeld of
electronic communications services. Importantly this
Directive lays down rules regarding the processing of
location data, in particular it states that: “location data
may only be processed when made anonymous or with
prior consent and only for the duration necessary for the
provision of a value added service”, being: “any service
which requires the processing of trafﬁc data or location
data other than trafﬁc data beyond what is necessary for the
transmission of a communication or the billing thereof”.
Prior consent and anonymisation are the only valid grounds
for processing location data. In practice, the only valid
ground in most cases will be prior consent as the Art. 29
WP has stipulated that “true anonymisation is increasingly
hard to realize and (. . .) the combined location data might
still lead to identiﬁcation” [8]
III. SOFT AND HARD LOCATION PRIVACY SOLUTIONS
Given this technological and normative framework, we
consider two issues related to the use of third party location
services. In the ﬁrst case the data controller, i.e. the third
party who receives the data, is trusted; in the second case,
is untrusted. Note that when the data controller is trusted the
data protection goal is to ensure that users are aware of how
their personal data are used. Conversely if the data controller
is untrusted, the data protection goal is to minimize the
transfer of data so as to reduce the need of trust. These two
situations are at the basis of the concepts of soft privacy
and hard privacy discussed among the others by Danezis
[3]. This distinction can be easily transposed to location
privacy. Accordingly, soft (location) privacy solutions in-
clude privacy policies, users’ consent, audit controls and
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so on. Hard (location) privacy solutions include privacy-
enhancing techniques such as location obfuscation methods
and cryptographic solutions. The two approaches discussed
in what follows exemplify a soft privacy and hard privacy
solution respectively.
A. Soft privacy: location standards
The W3C organization has proposed a standard API (Ap-
plication Programming Interface) to request location services
from a Web application [7]. Speciﬁcally the so called W3C
geo-location API (simply API hereinafter) is recommended
standard since May 2012. This API provides the abstract
speciﬁcation of a set of operations, which embedded in Web
pages, enable to estimate the location of the users visiting the
Web site. The API is coupled with HTML5 and supported
by all major Web browsers. Moreover it is used by popular
applications such as Foursquare and Facebook.
This standard prescribes that users must give explicit
consent to the computation of their location. For example
Figure 2 shows the home page of a geo-enabled Web
site, called wayn (http://wayn.modap.org), developed as
case study. This application uses the geo-location API to
estimate the location of each user visiting the Web site
from any device, mobile or not, and stores this information
together with a few additional information in a repository
on the server. Figure 2 highlights the request of user’s
consent. The research question we address in [1] is whether
Figure 2. As the Web page is accessed the user is prompted with the
request of consent (highlighted by the red ellipse)
the privacy mechanisms offered by the W3C geo-location
API for the collection of personal location data (i.e. user’s
consent), is sufﬁcient to comply with data protection norms
in Europe. Indeed the question is of practical relevance as
the use of standard location services aligned with privacy
regulations would make the collection of mobility data
easier. In what follows we brieﬂy describe key features of
the API and summarize major ﬁndings.
The W3C API. The API is agnostic of the positioning
technology, i.e. the location can be requested without
specifying how to estimate the location, e.g. using GPS,
Wi-Fi based positioning or IP addressing. This simplicity
of use is however paid for in term of ﬂexibility and
transparency, because the application provider is not in the
position of exercising any control on the way the location
is computed, in particular on whether the location is
computed locally or by a third party while this is important
for privacy. Indeed, what happens in practice is that the Web
browser translates such an operation into a geo-location
service request for the LP. Accordingly, any time the user
is located the location is communicated to the LP.
Privacy analysis. Back to the initial question, i.e.
whether the privacy mechanism of the W3C is aligned with
data protection norms in Europe, this is a complex issue
which calls for an interdisciplinary analysis. The analysis
conducted in [1] assumes the applicability of the ePrivacy
Directive without entering into the discussion whether or
not the ePrivacy Directive is applicable. The two major
issues regard the nature of user’s consent and the role of
data controller. According to the DPD the data controller
is the person or body which alone or jointly with others
determines the purposes and means of the processing of
personal data. The data controller is responsible for full
compliance with data protection regulations.
Ideally the data controller is the application provider.
What happens in reality is that the application provider
is not aware of who is going to compute the client lo-
cation, because that depends on the Web browser chosen
by the user. Therefore, the data controller does not have
control on location processing while the qualiﬁcation of the
Web browser and the LP under the Data protection and
the ePrivacy Directive is problematic as they do not fall
under the strict authority of the application. This issue is
especially problematic in view of the legal requirement of
consent. Consent is only valid if speciﬁc, freely given, and
informed. As the application provider is not in a position
to properly provide information, as he himself is not aware
of the speciﬁcs of the processing determined by user’s Web
browser, the legal basis for the processing falls to pieces.
In other words, making it illegal. Besides this major issue,
the analysis leads to a whole array of legal questions while
suggesting technical enhancements of the API [1].
B. Hard privacy: protecting location from untrusted LPs
Let us turn to consider the case in which the LP is not
trusted. We recall that in our scenario the LP computes
the client location upon request, based on contextual
information, e.g. the Wi-Fi networks in proximity. One
could argue that the location could be processed locally so
to avoid any privacy issues, like for example in the Intel
PlaceLab [5]. Unfortunately PlaceLab-like architectures
conﬂict with the dominant business model offering location
services for free in exchange for location data. We have
thus devised an approach which seeks to minimize the
communication with the LP.
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Minimizing the interaction. The idea behind [2] is
that the amount of information that the user transmits to
the LP exceeds what is really necessary to determine the
users’ location. In fact every time a service is requested
from a given place, e.g. home, the client transmits the same
or similar contextual information, e.g. Wi-Fi access points.
One can thus observe that if clients would acquire the
capability of recognizing autonomously the places that have
been already visited, the location information would only be
requested to the LP when it is strictly necessary. As a result,
the communication would be minimized. To implement
this idea, we devise an approach based on the metaphor
of private place. Private place is an abstraction which
conceptualizes the intuition that there are some regions of
space that belong to the personal sphere. The intuition is
that whenever the user is in a private space, the location
should not be disclosed to the LP. In order to recognize
whether the position is inside or outside a private place,
using a consumer device, without interacting every time
with the LP we take inspiration from previous approaches
such as [4] to develop a solution which associates every
place a radio ﬁngerprint, speciﬁed in terms of Wi-Fi access
points. Private places are recognized by comparing the
networking infrastructure detected in a point, e.g. the Wi-Fi
access points, with the set of radio ﬁngerprints.
Privacy rules Minimizing the interaction with the
LP, however, does not forestall the disclosure of the private
place to the application provider. Every time, the user
requests a service from, say, home, where home is a private
place, the position conventionally associated with the
private place at the time the place is deﬁned, is disclosed
to the application provider (conversely the service could
not be requested). Therefore if the application provider is
untrustworthy or collude with the LP, location privacy is
again at risk. To achieve a comprehensive protection of
location from both the LP and the application provider, the
approach is to use privacy rules. An example of privacy
rule is the following:
Home, [19 : 00, 08 : 00]→ cityOf(Home)
Home is the name of a private place. The rule means that
when the user is at home during the night, the location
communicated to the application provider is the city in which
home is located.
Architecture. The architecture of the system is illustrated
in Figure 3. It consists of two main building blocks, called
Place Handler and Policy Handler, respectively. The Place
Handler provides the user with a set of functionalities to
create private places and to automatically recognize whether
the user is inside or in proximity of one of the private
places previously deﬁned. The Policy Handler enables the
Figure 3. Privacy-enhanced location system: client architecture
speciﬁcation and enforcement of privacy rules. When a
location is to be communicated to the application provider,
the system ﬁrst checks whether the mobile device is located
in a private place and if it is so, enforces the privacy policy.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
Location privacy requirements and solutions much depend
on the characteristics of the applications. Nevertheless, a
conceptual framework on location privacy general enough to
provide guidance across different typologies of applications
is still lacking. Building such a framework is a major
challenge for future research on location privacy.
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